

# Living With Ambiguity: Pricing Mortality-linked Securities With Smooth Ambiguity Preferences

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# Outline

- 1 Introduction
  - Mortality Risk and Uncertainty
  - Ambiguity and MLS Pricing
- 2 Our Methodologies
  - Summary of Our Methodologies
  - An Asymmetric Mortality Jump Model
  - Smooth Ambiguity Preferences
  - Indifference Pricing and Market Open-Up
  - Economic Pricing and Market Equilibrium
- 3 Main Results

## Uncertainty In Mortality

- Mortality is a stochastic process: it is improving, to some extent, in an unpredictable way.
- We have imprecise knowledge about the probability distribution of future mortality rates.
- It seems appropriate to define mortality/longevity risk in a more general term of *ambiguity* in the sense of Knight (1921).

**Risk** probabilities known random events.

**Ambiguity** unknown probability assignment.

## Uncertainty in Mortality Models

- Two kinds of uncertainty
  - Model misspecification
  - Parameter estimation
- Parameter uncertainty is particularly unavoidable in any model-based approach (Li and Ng, 2011)
- We think that parameter uncertainty has not be fully explored.

For instance, Cairns et al. (2006b) acknowledge ambiguity using Bayesian analysis, but treat it in an *ambiguity-neutral* way.

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# Ambiguity Aversion and Asset Pricing

- Thought experiments such as the famous Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961) provide evidence that individuals generally prefer the least ambiguous acts.
- People usually exhibit ambiguity aversion, which can be thought as an aversion to any mean-preserving spread in the space of probabilities (Alary et al. 2010).
- If market participants are ambiguity averse, the ambiguity itself will finally find its way into the security prices in the form of premiums (Liu et al. 2005).

# Pricing Techniques for MLS in Incomplete Market

- Pricing Techniques:
  - Arbitrage free pricing method (Cairns et al. 2006b, Bauer et al. 2010).
  - Wang transform (Dowd et al. 2006, Denuit et al. 2007, Lin and Cox 2008, Chen and Cox 2009).
  - Esscher transform (Chen et al. 2010, Li et al. 2010).
  - Instantaneous Sharpe ratio (Young 2008, Bayraktar et al. 2009).
  - Maximum entropy principle (Kogure and Kurachi 2010).
  - Indifference pricing approach (Cui 2008, Cox et al. 2010).
  - Tâtonnement (Economic) pricing approach (Zhou et al. 2011).
- In this study, we focus on the Indifference Pricing and Economic Pricing

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## Summary of Our Objectives&Methodologies

- Objective: to explore the effects of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion on mortality risk modeling and pricing
- Main methodologies:
  - Mortality Rate Forecasting Under Parameter Uncertainty
    - Incorporate parameter uncertainty into an asymmetric mortality jump model proposed by Chen et al. (2011)
  - Mortality-linked Security Pricing and Market Equilibrium
    - Economic agent's ambiguity aversion (smooth ambiguity aversion)
    - Market open up (Indifference Pricing)
    - Market equilibrium (Economic Pricing)

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# An Asymmetric Mortality Jump Model

- Lee-Carter Model

$$\ln(m_{x,t}) = a_x + b_x k_t + e_{x,t}$$

- An Asymmetric Mortality Jump Model proposed by Chen et al.(2011)
  - Negative and positive jumps feature different frequency and severity
  - Mortality jumps have asymmetric time impact on mortality dynamics

$$\begin{cases} \tilde{k}_{t+1} = \tilde{k}_t + (u - \Lambda) + \sigma Z_{t+1} + Y_{t+1} \mathbf{1}_{\{Y_{t+1} < 0\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{N_{t+1}=1\}} \\ k_{t+1} = \tilde{k}_{t+1} + Y_{t+1} \mathbf{1}_{\{Y_{t+1} < 0\}} \mathbf{1}_{\{N_{t+1}=1\}} \end{cases}$$

## An Asymmetric Mortality Jump Model(2)

Using the U.S. mortality data from 1900 to 2006, Chen et al. (2011) estimate the parameters.

- The estimate of the probability of positive jumps is equal to one
- This model provides the best fit compared other mortality jump models based on AIC and BIC.

Table 1: Parameter Estimates for the Asymmetric Double Exponential Jump Model

	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error
$\mu$	-0.2457	0.0394
$\sigma$	0.3578	0.0390
$\lambda$	0.0837	0.0667
$\eta_u$	1.4209	0.8654
$\eta_d$	N/A	N/A
$p$	1	N/A

Source: Chen et al. (2011)

# Incorporating Parameter Uncertainty in Asymmetric Mortality Jump Model

- We explore the parameter uncertainty on the mean rate of mortality change,  $\mu$ , in four scenarios

Scenario	Parameter Uncertainty	Ambiguity Averse	Distribution of $\mu$
1	No	No	Use the estimated $\hat{\mu}$ as the true value for forecasting
2	Yes	No	A uniform distribution over 95% confidence interval of $\hat{\mu}$
3	Yes	No	Update the uniform prior via Metropolis-Hasting method
4	Yes	Yes	A uniform distribution over 95% confidence interval of $\hat{\mu}$

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# Smooth Ambiguity Preferences

- Smooth ambiguity preference is axiomatized by Klibanoff, et al. (2005).
- It starts from computing the (first order) expected utility conditional on a given prior distribution, then moves to the (second order) expectation of the distorted expected utility over the mass of all priors.
- It allows a separation between ambiguity (belief in regard to uncertainty) and ambiguity aversion (taste with respect to ambiguity).
- Klibanoff et al. (2005) also show that the maxmin preference model is a limiting case of the smooth ambiguity preference model when the degree of ambiguity goes to infinity.

## Smooth Ambiguity Preferences(2)

- The ambiguity of the uncertain parameter  $\mu$  is characterized by a set of priors  $\Lambda$ .
  - Each  $\mu \in \Lambda$  describes a possible scenario.
  - $p(\mu)$  is the probabilistic belief over the different scenarios
- The *ex ante* welfare of the agent is measured by

$$V = \phi^{-1} \left( \int_{\Lambda_t} \phi(E^\mu [u(z)] p(\mu)) d\mu \right)$$

- Following Gollier (2010) , we use an exponential-power specification for  $(u, \phi)$ , e.g. each agent has a *negative exponential utility function* and exhibits *constant ambiguity aversion*

$$u(z) = -e^{-\rho z}, \phi(u) = -\frac{(-u)^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma}$$



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# Indifference Pricing and Market Open-Up

- We adopt indifference pricing to study the range of possible prices  $[P^-, P^+]$  for the market to open up.

- The minimal ask price ( $P^-$ ) for insurer is given by

$$P^- \triangleq \operatorname{argmax}_P \left\{ V_{av}^A(P) = \bar{V}_{av}^A \right\}$$

$$V_{av}^A(P) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta^A} \int_{\Lambda_t} \phi \left( E \left[ \mu^A(\tilde{w}_T^A) | \mu \right] p(\mu) \right) d\mu$$

$$\bar{V}_{av}^A = \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta^A} \int_{\Lambda_t} \phi \left( E \left[ \mu^A(w_T^A) | \mu \right] p(\mu) \right) d\mu$$

- The maximal bid price ( $P^+$ ) for investor is given by

$$P^+ \triangleq \operatorname{argmax}_P \left\{ V_{av}^B(P) = \bar{V}_{av}^B \right\}$$

$$V_{av}^B(P) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta^B} \int_{\Lambda_t} \phi \left( E \left[ \mu^B(\tilde{w}_T^B) | \mu \right] p(\mu) \right) d\mu$$

$$\bar{V}_{av}^B = \operatorname{argmax}_{\theta^B} \int_{\Lambda_t} \phi \left( E \left[ \mu^B(w_T^B) | \mu \right] p(\mu) \right) d\mu$$

## Indifference Pricing and Market Open-Up(2)

### Assumptions of agent's wealth process

- Both agents can only invest in either the mortality-linked security or a bank account.
- The mortality-linked security's payoff( $g_t(Q_t)$ ) and insurer's liability( $f_t(Q_t)$ ) are determined by mortality path  $Q_t = (q_1, \dots, q_t)$ .
- There is no borrowing restrictions on both agents.

### Proposition 1

With the exponential-power specification, the price range  $[P^-, P^+]$  does not depend on the initial wealth of both agents.

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# Economic Pricing and Market Equilibrium

- Our economic pricing algorithm can be summarized as
  - Suppose an imaginary auctioneer calls an arbitrary price, say  $P_0$ .
  - Given price, agent A and B then decide their supply  $\theta^A$  and demand  $\theta^B$  of the mortality-linked security to maximize their end-of-period expected utility, respectively.
  - If the market is not cleared, the auctioneer has to adjust the price until  $\theta^A(P) = \theta^B(P)$ .

## Economic Pricing Algorithm(2)

### Setting of optimization problems

- Insurer

$$\theta^A(P) = \underset{\theta^A}{\operatorname{argmax}} E [\phi (E^\mu [u (\tilde{w}_T^A)])]$$

$$s.t. \begin{cases} \theta^A \geq 0 \\ \underset{\theta^A}{\operatorname{argmax}} E [\phi (E^\mu [u (\tilde{w}_T^A)])] > E [\phi (E^\mu [u (w_T^A)])] \quad \text{if } \theta^A > 0 \end{cases}$$

- Investor

$$\theta^B(P) = \underset{\theta^B}{\operatorname{argmax}} E [\phi (E^\mu [u (\tilde{w}_T^B)])]$$

$$s.t. \begin{cases} \theta^B \geq 0 \\ \underset{\theta^B}{\operatorname{argmax}} E [\phi (E^\mu [u (\tilde{w}_T^B)])] > E [\phi (E^\mu [u (w_T^B)])] \quad \text{if } \theta^B > 0 \end{cases}$$

## Economic Pricing Algorithm (3)

### Assumptions of wealth process

- We keep the same assumptions for agents' wealth distribution and the payoffs of the mortality-linked security.
- Particularly, the auctioneer is assumed to adjust the price by following formula:

$$P_{k+1} = P_k + h|P_k|(\theta^B - \theta^A) \quad h \in \mathbb{R}^+$$

### Proposition 2

With the exponential-power specification, the equilibrium price  $P$  does not depend on the initial wealth of both agents.



## Economic Pricing Algorithm (3)

### Assumptions of wealth process


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# Connection Between Indifference Pricing and Economic Pricing




Demand/Supply Curve From  
Economic Pricing

## Proposition 3

The indifference pricing approach and the economic pricing approach are connected in the sense that  $P^- = P^A$ ,  $P^+ = P^B$ .

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## Settings of Numerical Example

- Agent A(Insurer) has life insurance liabilities  $f_t(Q_t) = 500q_t$  at time t,contingent on a mortality index  $q_t = m_{65+t,t}$ .
- The mortality bond that can be issued by agent A has a similar structure as the first pure mortality bond issued by Swiss Re in December 2003

- Face Value: \$1 dollar
- Term: Three years
- Annual coupon rate:150 basis point+ risk free interest rate (3%)
- Principle repayment at maturity depends on the  $q_t$ over the term of the bond

$$\text{Principle Repayment} = \max \left\{ 1 - \sum_{t=1}^3 \text{loss}_t, 0 \right\}$$

$$\text{loss}_t = \frac{\max(q_t - 1.1q_0, 0) - \max(q_t - 1.3q_0, 0)}{0.2q_0}$$

- We also assume that there is no trading of the mortality-linked security once it is issued. There are no borrowing constraints for both agents.

## Pricing Results for Scenario 1-4


	$E(\mu)$	$P^-$	$P^+$	$P^*$	$Q^*$	Agent B's Annualized Return (%)	Excess Return (%)
1. Best Estimate	-0.2457	0.5033	0.6244	0.5851	1.4776	5.16%	2.16%
2. Uniform Prior	-0.2457	0.5029	0.6243	0.5849	1.4759	5.17%	2.17%
3. Uniform Prior MH Sampling	-0.2458	0.5033	0.6247	0.5854	1.4809	5.15%	2.15%
4. Uniform prior Ambiguity Aversion	-0.2457	0.5017	0.6243	0.5845	1.4786	5.20%	2.20%

Parameter setting for different scenarios:

Scenario 1-3:  $\rho^A = 1, \rho^B = 0.5, \gamma^A = 0, \gamma^B = 0$ ; Scenario 4:  $\rho^A = 1, \rho^B = 0.5, \gamma^A = 5, \gamma^B = 5$

- In scenario 1, there is no parameter uncertainty
- In scenario 2-3, there are parameter uncertainties but both agents are ambiguity neutral
- In scenario 4, there is parameter uncertainty and both agents exhibit ambiguity aversion

## Discussion on Scenario 1



- The mortality bond is sold at \$ 0.5851, or nearly 41% below its face value (\$ 1).
- This is due to the bond's principle payment upon its maturity.
- The mean principle repayment ratio is 0.5408.
- Investor's annualized return is 5.16%
- Investor's excess return is 2.16%.

## Effect of Risk Aversion

$\rho^A$	$\rho^B$	$P^-$	$P^+$	$P^*$	$Q^*$	Agent B's Annualized Return	Risk Premium
1.0	0.5	0.5033	0.6244	0.5851	1.4776	5.16%	2.16%
1.0	0.7	0.5033	0.6244	0.5756	1.2999	5.71%	2.71%
0.8	0.5	0.5280	0.6244	0.5881	1.3671	4.99%	1.99%
0.8	0.7	0.5280	0.6244	0.5802	1.1818	5.44%	2.44%

### Proposition 4

Using an exponential utility, the risk aversion of agent B does not affect the maximal bid price ( $P^+$ ).

## Effect of Risk Aversion


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### Proposition 4

Using an exponential utility, the risk aversion of agent B does not affect the maximal bid price ( $P^+$ ).



# Risk Aversion & Market Equilibrium



- As insure becomes *less* risk averse
  - Supply curve shifts downward
  - The minimal ask price increases
  - $P^* \uparrow Q^* \downarrow$
- As investor becomes *more* risk averse
  - Demand curve rotates counter clockwise
  - The maximal bid price remain the same
  - $P^* \downarrow Q^* \downarrow$

## Effect of Ambiguity Aversion

$\gamma^A$	$\gamma^B$	$P^-$	$P^+$	$P^*$	$Q^*$	Agent B's Annualized Return	Excess Return	Ambiguity Premium
0	0	0.5030	0.6243	0.5850	1.4780	5.17%	2.17%	0.01%
0	5	0.5030	0.6243	0.5847	1.4726	5.19%	2.19%	0.03%
0	10	0.5030	0.6243	0.5844	1.4672	5.20%	2.20%	0.04%
5	0	0.5017	0.6243	0.5848	1.4840	5.18%	2.18%	0.02%
5	5	0.5017	0.6243	0.5845	1.4786	5.20%	2.20%	0.04%
5	10	0.5017	0.6243	0.5842	1.4732	5.21%	2.21%	0.06%
10	0	0.5003	0.6243	0.5846	1.4898	5.19%	2.19%	0.03%
10	5	0.5003	0.6243	0.5843	1.4844	5.21%	2.21%	0.05%
10	10	0.5003	0.6243	0.5841	1.4791	5.22%	2.22%	0.06%

### Proposition 5

In an exponential-power specification, the maximal bid price ( $P^+$ ) is not affected by either risk aversion or ambiguity aversion of agent B.

## Effect of Ambiguity Aversion

$\gamma^A$	$\gamma^B$	$P^-$	$P^+$	$P^*$	$Q^*$	Agent B's Annualized Return	Excess Return	Ambiguity Premium
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

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- The ambiguity aversion has similar effects on market equilibrium.
- Ambiguity aversion has a much smaller effect than risk aversion.

# Performances of Economic Pricing Algorithm



# Summary

- We find that indifference pricing and economic pricing are intrinsically connected.
- We find that changes in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion have similar effects on the price range and the equilibrium price/quantity. However, risk aversion plays a more prominent role in our numerical example.
- Future research
  - Relax the assumption of a competitive and information efficient market for mortality-linked securities
  - Relax the assumption of no secondary market for mortality-linked securities and thus no trade after the first issuance

## Discussion

- Questions/Suggestions?